The Scenario of a Duterte
presidency: a weak Chief Executive looms in the horizon
“ and why most of Duterte’s
promises would not happen”
A Duterte presidency would not be as strong as what the Pnoy
administration thinks it would be. The fact is—it would be the weakest
presidency in the history of this Republic, because the popular Mayor of Davao
would be facing an “opposition-filled House and Supreme Court”—the two other
branches of government that comprise this Republic. Without a synergistic
relationship with these two branches of government, Duterte would be like a
sitting duck. The minute Duterte loses his political charm, that would be the
end of him. And history is replete with case studies of leaders who only last
months politically because the leader depended only on the strength of his
popularity, not on other variables of maintaining power.
That is why stable democracies do not elect leaders merely
on the strength of popularity. The fact is—I do not even compare Duterte with
Hitler. Duterte is a poor copy of the former German dictator.
Hitler rose to prominence not just because of his great
oratorial skills---he was backed by an ideologically driven political party.
That party was supported by eminent members of German society—highly esteemed
members of both the civilian and military elite—that gave that party
legitimacy.
In Duterte’s case, yes, he is popular because of his
oratorial skills yet he does not have the backing of an ideologically driven
political party. The minute Duterte loses his connexion with the masses, that
would spell his demise as a political actor.
Now, on Duterte’s pronouncement that he would announce the
closing of Congress if he would encounter great difficulty pursuing his
legislative agenda, there is nothing in the present Constitution which empowers
him to just unilaterally abolish Congress. That power was exactly the thing
which the framers of the 1987 Philippine Constitution abolished when they
created the present Charter.
Since the good Mayor happens to be a lawyer, Duterte probably
meant the power as stated in Section 18 of Article 7. Unfortunately for the
mayor, that section does not contemplate the grant of absolute power to the
President—it does give the power to declare martial law or a state of emergency
but subject to very strict checks by Congress and review by the Supreme Court.
Hence, even if Duterte goes into a tantrum and threaten members of the House
and the Supreme Court with death, his bravado would amount to nothing, and
would even place him in a very delicate situation—that is impeachment.
Hence, this early, expect a titanic battle between a strong
willed Chief Executive who would take an oath of faithfully executing the laws
of the land (Section 17, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution) ranged
against proxies of traditional oligarchs in the persons of people in both
Houses of Congress and the Supreme Court. These three forces would use the law
as their weapons to attack each other or use these laws as tools to pursue
their own personal agenda. In all likelihood, expect no major or substantive
change to happen within the first two years of a Duterte presidency because the
three branches of this Republic would be “feeling each other out.”
A Strong Chief
Executive cannot exercise complete power
The 1987 Constitution was created in such a way that power
is evenly distributed in various state institutions such as the Chief
Executive, the legislative, the judicial as well as constitutional commissions.
There are sufficient provisions which bars one organ of power from exercising
an excess of power. A strong President can be checkmated by the Supreme Court,
as is a strong Chief Justice, admonished by a strong Speaker of the House or a
Senate president.
Yes, the President holds the power of funds allocation yet
this is checked by the House. If the House uses government funds not in
conjunction with what the Charter says, then, the Supreme Court enters into the
fray, and exercises its power of judicial review. This very same process
applies when a strong President exercises his appointive powers. Both Congress
and the Supreme Court can use their powers to publicly dissuade a President
from appointing such a person which could even reach a point of an actual
confrontation, such as what happened between President Aquino and his
appointees whose appointments were stalled by the appointment bodies of both
Congress.
An Opposition-filled
Congress and a Yellow Supreme Court
What backers of Duterte failed to see is that, in the end
game, they would find it extremely hard to effect the promises Duterte gave to
the people during the elections. Duterte may yet win this elections, but lose
big in the end.
This early, Duterte stands to lose Congress as an ally
because most of those running for Congress are members of the Liberal party.
Will I mention the Supreme Court, majority of the members owe their sinecures
to President Aquino? Just look at how the Supreme Court decided in the Poe case
and that would show you how “yellow” this Court is. Would be it easy for Duterte
to just flick a switch and thereafter see the dissolution of this Court? You
wish. That would never happen.
The judicial department is managed and is being controlled
by big firms, most of which do not count Duterte as a client. “ The firm” which
is composed of two factions, is highly influential in the judiciary because
partners of this”firm” have used their influence over five administrations to
appoint their own men into highly sensitive judicial posts. There are other law
firms which compete with the “firm” in this arena, and they have the interests
of their clients in their minds. Obviously, these legal carpet baggers would
surely flex their muscles and oppose Duterte if this president begins to
maneuver. There are sufficient laws to counter whatever changes Duterte wants
to effect.
Duterte’s camp has put all their marbles in one basket that
they failed to see that for their candidate to succeed as a president, he needs
Congress to be on his side. The PDP-Laban has no solid numbers at both houses.
The fact is—it is a minority political party. For Duterte’s presidency to last,
Duterte has to have a strong backing in Congress.
At this juncture, it is too late. The Liberal party and
other political parties in opposition to Duterte would surely fill up these
seats in Congress—both the Lower and Upper houses. Of course, Duterte’s camp
always show several politicians migrating from their traditional political
parties to Duterte’s but this is an expected political phenomenon. Eventually,
these people would shift back to their parties after the election. Some would
probably stick it out with Duterte but if push comes to shove and the heat
turns extremely hot or this public adoration for Duterte wanes due to
frustration or, worse, unfulfilled promises sore Duterte’s relations with his
constituency, these politicians would eventually abandon him.
This is the fault of Duterte in the first place---he did not
build a party out of this people’s movement. For Duterte to succeed and for him
to politically survive Manalacanan, he needs an ideologically driven party, a
party that exists with one goal---effect real change in the government. What he
has right now is a messy organisation united behind his persona of which he
derives strength only thru his popularity at this point. The minute Duterte
loses his charm, that would eventually spell his political demise.
Even if Duterte
emerges as a majority president, he cannot exercise his own personal will
against what the present Constitution provides.
This early, expect a titanic battle of wits and resources
between Duterte and civil society groups aided by big business interests. Big
business interests here are controlled by traditional political families with
substantial monies to effect a destabilizing environment. They can probably
accept a momentary loss of income for at least three years while preparing the
ground work for Duterte’s impeachment.
Now, if Duterte expects to exercise proto-dictatorial powers
upon the business community, that would eventually lead to an ouster scenario
similar with what happened to former president Joseph Estrada.
For one, a President Duterte would using his appointing
power to influence the conduct of members of the Legislative department. We all
know that politics here is just a tool of pursuing Oligarchic influence.
On proclaiming a
revolutionary government
If Duterte accepts and is sworn into office under the
present Constitution, the good mayor would definitely find it extremely hard to
declare a revolutionary government. For one, the Constitution does not have a
provision for a declaration of a revolutionary government, even in the most
dire of situations such as lawless violence or the absence of law and order.
Yes, there is a provision of a declaration of martial rule or a state of
emergency but it is subject to a review by Congress and the Supreme Court.
How then can Duterte fulfill his promise of creating a
revolutionary government? Sincerely, nothing in the Constitution states that.
In the event though that Duterte tenders his resignation as
President, he cannot use it as a pretext for declaring or transforming the
government from de jure to de facto. If Duterte resigns, then, the Constitution
has sufficient succession plans in place. Duterte cannot just dictate the terms
of his succession like how he envisions it in his mind right now. The Vice
president replaces him should he resigns.
Two years of listless
growth, uncertainty
The first test for Duterte would actually be when he
exercises his power of appointment. With an opposition dominated Senate, his
appointees would surely encounter rough sailing in their confirmation. The second test would be the passage of the
2017 national budget. Again, with an opposition-filled House, Duterte would
surely find it extremely hard for his proposed budget to pass the scrutiny of
Congress. What would probably happen is the passage of a re-enacted national
budget for the first year.
With a re-enacted budget, expect several big ticket items or
projects to encounter delays in their implementation. Surely, Duterte’s backers
in big business would entice him to give them several concessions, most of
them, these big government items. And we all know what would happen if these
business titans fail to get what they want---they shift political alliance as
fast as how politicians do it. Duterte would not have any option but to delay
implementation so as to frustrate these business backers. Or, he may opt to
give them these concessions by which he stands a great risk of sacrificing his own
political fate or capital with his constituency who expects much from him.
Of course, Duterte’s very first project of which he
salivates much is his highly popular goal of anti-criminality. On the first few
months, Duterte would create another presidential anti-criminality task force
of which he expects to lead. If Duterte
unleashes and uses full state power against organized crime which includes
those within the bureaucracy, expect a full destabilising situation because
several business interests would surely be affected by this campaign. If
Duterte expects to encounter just street smart alecks running these vice
groups, he must be prepared to be shocked to his wits. These vice lords have
the power to effect both street-level violence and national violence. They have
their own backers in the bureaucracy, probably even as high up as those in the
military, police and Executive and judicial departments. Killing them all would
be extremely hard. These vice lords are expected to unite, and together create
a force that would just destabilize a Duterte administration.
For one, Duterte would even find it extremely hard to reform
the very executive department (the bureaucracy) of which he is expected to
lead. The bureaucracy, as I described it, has become a humongous louse of a
syndicate controlled by mini-gods who thinks only of their personal fiduciary
interests rather than the interest of the nation.
Creating a National
Unity Government
Duterte promises to bring back his old mentor, Jose Maria
Sison into the country and create what he calls a “national democratic
coalition government.” In all honesty, this is a good proposition. For one, if
it succeeds, it may probably bring lasting peace in this fragmented nation.
However, we all know what this 40 plus year old insurgency
have already created for this country—a highly pro-status quo
military--majority of which are composed of staunch anti-communists. Bringing
back Sison would actually be a highly emotional issue with soldiers of this
Republic, much the same way as most opposed giving land to the Bangsamoros thru
legal means. The AFP would probably
accept a conclusion of the insurgency through the negotiating table but giving
plush or juicy posts to these insurgents would surely create antipathy and
animosity among the troops.
Personally, I do not believe that it is entirely safe for
Joma to come back at this time or even when Duterte wins. For one, there is
simply no assurance even under a Duterte or a Poe administration that the Leftist
ideologue would be given sufficient security. Even during the most liberal of
administrations—that of Aquino and Arroyo—Joma Sison’s safety was never
assured. The fact was, under Arroyo, several die-hard anti-Sison elements close
to the former president even conspired to deploy assassination squads abroad
just to liquidate Sison. How much more in a Duterte presidency where active
elements of Norberto Gonzales, an anti-Joma and former National security
adviser and promoter of the Filipino version of nationalist socialism here,
expect to once more occupy sensitive government posts via Peter Lavina,
Duterte’s propaganda man.
The only way a Sison can come back here is for Duterte to
dominate the armed forces in an ideological manner and control the AFP and
transform it into his own personal force. Basing on the present situation, this
is entirely far fetched. There is no indication that Duterte is a raving
ideologue of a person. Of course, Duterte has the charisma to rouse people to
take action yet he does not have the skill to inspire and deepen the belief of
the people to follow him wherever he wants to go because of his lack of
ideological grounding.
Besides, how can you even control a fragmented military? As
of this time, Duterte’s backers are former military men. There are probably
some still in active service yet these people have oppositors also in the lower
ranks who exercises real control and power over the troops. These lower ranked
officers are the most staunch anti-Communists due to their experience fighting
these insurgents in the field, especially those who saw their own comrades
killed during encounters. Will they still follow the chain of command in the
event of a Duterte presidency?
Instability for the next two years
This early, indications are rife that Davao city mayor Rody
Duterte would win this elections. There are just three things that would bar
his anointment as the People’s President: first, electoral fraud which would
result to the proclamation of an unacceptable winner. Second, failure of
elections due to widespread violence which would frustrate the electoral
results and lead to a non-proclamation. And third, massive disfranchisement of
voters who would mostly vote for him.
This early, it would seem that the public has been
conditioned by Duterte forces that he would win. The truth is—both this
administration and Duterte forces have used these surveys as tools for
conditioning the minds of the people that there are only two contending forces
with sufficient forces to win the elections. In reality, there is a legitimate
third force---the political machinery of the Vice President—that expects a win
in the ground war. Digressing a bit, it is only Binay that is the most
acceptable winner of this highly-contested elections.
Of course, people would say that Grace Poe stands a big
chance of winning after surveys show that she is the acceptable “second
choice.” The thing is, for that to become a reality, Poe has to have what Binay
has—a strong grassroots political machinery. Unfortunately for the vice president,
he does not have what Poe has—popular trust. Yes, both Poe and Binay have high
popularity ratings yet Poe’s numbers are better than Binay because he lost some
of the trust of the voters. Clearly, the baseless accusations hurled by his
political enemies have stuck to Binay like glue that he encountered great
difficulty convincing his own core voters several of whom transferred to
Duterte.
It very unlikely that Rody Duterte would be able to
establish himself as a dictator once he wins this elections. For one, Duterte
would not have the entire support of the incoming Congress. It is evident that
support for Duterte comes from local government officials, not exactly from
elected members of Congress. Second, Duterte would be facing a Supreme Court
filled with pro-Pnoy justices and a faction of the previous Arroyo
administration.
Thus, we are seeing an “isolated” Chief Executive at this
early.
In all likelihood, the 17th Congress would be
filled with pro-Pnoy legislators. Basing on the surveys, even the Senate would
be populated by Yellowtards. Since Duterte does not have his own political
party (remember that PDP-Laban is just his endorsing party), there is a strong
possibility that majority of the senate would not be supportive of the incoming
administration. The Liberal Party would still be the strongest opposition party
in Congress, both in the Upper and Lower chambers.
Of course, some would say that the Senate would actually
follow the “banner” of the winning presidential bet. It is possible that its
members would “configure” just to allign with the Chief Executive. I don’t see
that happening.
There would be a sizeable number of oppositors against
Duterte.
Duterte faces not
just a pack, but packs of hungry dogs
Duterte pictures the presidency as a “strong one.” In
reality, it is not. While being president entitles you to powers which is
otherwise not enjoyed by a Chief Justice or a Senate president, these powers
are subject to checks and balances under the present Charter. For a president
to get what he wants, he needs to maneuver in a political manner. Duterte needs
to wade in the political pond.
Duterte wants to picture himself wading in the political
waters with the masses in his back. The reality is, Duterte would actually do
that alone. Of course, his experience as a city mayor would probably be of help
especially in the “wheeling and dealing”. What would Duterte face after winning
the presidency is beyond him. Being president is a daunting task, a delicate
balancing act.
For sure, Duterte faces a pack of hungry dogs. At the start,
Duterte needs to satiate those hungry packs of dogs from his own group. If you
look at his backers, these people are hungry for political vendetta, mostly
people who were relegated at the sidelines during the Aquino administration. They have invested not just time but their
monies and their financial backers’ monies for Duterte. They would seek
political concessions, mostly concessions that would allow them to recover
their financial investments.
First off, Duterte’s big financial backers from the business
sector would ask his blessing to take part in government projects. Some would
probably ask him to turn a blind eye or loosen the regulatory environment a
little bit to accommodate the business interests of his financiers. Obviously,
these concesssions would impact on the economy, and eventually affect the very
constituency of Duterte which he gave much hope behind his.
The second pack of hungry dogs Duterte would face would be
those outside of his close circle but compromised their political stance in
exchange for electoral support. These are the political turncoats who would
expect their close associates to be given positions in government under
Duterte. Duterte would need to balance
the interests of his close supporters with those of these big time political
turncoats. At this juncture, Duterte would probably lose some supporters in
exchange for giving in to demands of these political turncoats. These spurned
supporters would form their group to assail him.
The third pack is Duterte’s affiliate political
groups---those who are not within his close circle but made political
allignments with him just for him to win. These groups have their individual
agendum, most would probably clash with what Duterte promised to the people,
that is a clean government.
The fourth pack of dogs Duterte stands to face is his
political enemies who would now work to shorten his political life. These would
comprise all groups which he alienated due to his political insensitivities and
worse, his crass-ness. This pack would be his most serious political nemesis
because most of these groups are driven not by business interests but by
ideology. When Duterte’s political honeymoon with the electorate fades
beginning on May 9, the good mayor would now face the political realities more
daunting than the threat and violence of those vice groups which once dominated
his Davao.
What would save
Duterte from his own self
Allow things to deteriorate. When the country reaches its
tipping point, use the Office of the President as a rallying point for a true
revolution. That revolution would be the tool for changing the Constitution. It
is only thru Constitutional change that would allow Duterte to fulfill what he
promised during the elections and what the people expect him to do. Will I see
Duterte hanged by the very people who elected him? Of course, this would never
happen under our “democratic” society. But of course, there is always a first
time, and that is, if things boil to such a point that Duterte loses control
and the people turn into a lynching mob. History is replete with such stories.
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