Arrest of Tiamzon a strategic error

Many analysts see the arrest of the Tiamzon couple as an opportunity for "moderate" factions of the Communist Party of the Philippines to open the possibility of resuming peace talks with the Aquino administration. Reports say, the Tiamzon couple is an obstacle to the peace process, and their arrest was ordered so that a group within the Party would be able to open the discussion for peace talks with the administration.

The question really is---will this arrest prod these "moderate elements" to reveal themselves openly in the Party's plenum, or will they instead support the old party line of active resistence as espoused by the Tiamzons? Several reports say that the party's founder favors a resumption of talks, which was opposed largely by members of the Politburo. Without the Tiamzons, will the Party now entertain the possibility of peace talks with government?

The military intelligence reports say that they have monitored the movements of the Tiamzon couple since last year. Reports say the Tiamzons have been staying in their house in Carcar Cebu since last year. The operation for their arrests however, was planned for two months. Meaning, intelligence operatives have already identified the location of the subjects and it was just a matter of two months before these operatives or their principals gave the go-ahead. The arrests was really timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Party.

Now, many say that the arrests will lead to a weakening of the Party. Analyzing everything that had happened in the past and the present condition of the struggle, the assertion is far from the truth.

First, there is a belief that the Tiamzons have taken a "sabatical leave" to allow younger members of the Party to take full control of Party activities. The Tiamzons have been staying in Cebu for a year now, contrary to earlier sightings pointing their location in Mindanao. This only shows that younger party members are now managing the affairs of the Party and they continue to engage in active political work to further develop their mass bases.

Hence, even without the Tiamzons at the helm of the Party, the Party and its armed wing are expected to continue their activities in their respective areas of operation.

Fact is, the arrest may even trigger a revitalization of the Party, making it stronger and more aggressive as it enters its fiftieth year of staging the People's protracted war.

There are younger leaders in their forties who are more strategic in terms of decision-making, bolder and more creative in tactical execution who are just waiting in the wings to ascend the higher rungs of the Party leadership.

With the Tiamzons out, there is a possibility that younger leaders would ascend the CPP-NPA-NDF leadership and usher the Party and its armed wing, the NPA to greater heights of struggle.

Let's consider the present and objective conditions of the struggle.

With 3,000 armed adherents, the NPA remains a major threat against the government. Their units are still spread throughout the archipelago. Their recruitment remains active.

What the government is not saying is the fact that the countrysides remain as fertile grounds for active involvement in the struggle. The Party and its revolutionary organisations enjoy a massive and widely extensive support base. These bases are still being managed directly by the Party and remains far away from the reach and grasp of government.

Central Visayas and Mindanao remain as active venues for recruitment precisely because of widespread disenchantment with government. The continued bungling of rehabilitation efforts in these parts would result to a horizontal increase of Party supporters and possibly from within, development of new cadres who are bolder and more aggressive than the rest.

The NPA is expected to change their tactics from merely political organizing to political-military work. In order to increase their ranks, they have to engage in active resistance, puncture rural centers of activities and engage in strategic and tactical alliances with other groups to further increase their chances of success against government forces.

With the signing of a peace agreement with the MILF, government will now face new and fresh opposition from groups who oppose the peace deal. These groups are composed not just of Islamic elements but criminal elements funded by traditional power blocs in Mindanao who fear of losing their lands once the Bangsamoro state is established.

Fresh anti-government initiatives are expected to break out in Mindanao which would divide the attention of the state's security forces.

Conflicts within the center of power will continue with elite groups fighting within themselves and government unable to provide sufficient solutions to consumer-related issues. As prices spiral out of control and government continues on its neo-liberal policy of non-interventionism when it comes to prices, dissent will surely increase not just from the ranks of the militants but likewise more political opposition to develop within the ranks of the middle class itself.

These things will develop for the next few months. The worse thing that would happen is when political forces intervene to further heighten these political tensions resulting to a further weakening of the State as it enters another historical milestone in 2016.

Two things are expected to develop as the direct result of the arrests of the Tiamzons. First, a revitalization of the Party and its armed wing and second, a development of a stronger, and more united Front which, given two or three years, would result to the achievement of the strategic stalemate status.