Many analysts see the arrest of the Tiamzon couple as an opportunity for "moderate" factions of the Communist Party of the Philippines to open the possibility of resuming peace talks with the Aquino administration. Reports say, the Tiamzon couple is an obstacle to the peace process, and their arrest was ordered so that a group within the Party would be able to open the discussion for peace talks with the administration.
The question really is---will this arrest prod these "moderate elements" to reveal themselves openly in the Party's plenum, or will they instead support the old party line of active resistence as espoused by the Tiamzons? Several reports say that the party's founder favors a resumption of talks, which was opposed largely by members of the Politburo. Without the Tiamzons, will the Party now entertain the possibility of peace talks with government?
The military intelligence reports say that they have monitored the movements of the Tiamzon couple since last year. Reports say the Tiamzons have been staying in their house in Carcar Cebu since last year. The operation for their arrests however, was planned for two months. Meaning, intelligence operatives have already identified the location of the subjects and it was just a matter of two months before these operatives or their principals gave the go-ahead. The arrests was really timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Party.
Now, many say that the arrests will lead to a weakening of the Party. Analyzing everything that had happened in the past and the present condition of the struggle, the assertion is far from the truth.
First, there is a belief that the Tiamzons have taken a "sabatical leave" to allow younger members of the Party to take full control of Party activities. The Tiamzons have been staying in Cebu for a year now, contrary to earlier sightings pointing their location in Mindanao. This only shows that younger party members are now managing the affairs of the Party and they continue to engage in active political work to further develop their mass bases.
Hence, even without the Tiamzons at the helm of the Party, the Party and its armed wing are expected to continue their activities in their respective areas of operation.
Fact is, the arrest may even trigger a revitalization of the Party, making it stronger and more aggressive as it enters its fiftieth year of staging the People's protracted war.
There are younger leaders in their forties who are more strategic in terms of decision-making, bolder and more creative in tactical execution who are just waiting in the wings to ascend the higher rungs of the Party leadership.
With the Tiamzons out, there is a possibility that younger leaders would ascend the CPP-NPA-NDF leadership and usher the Party and its armed wing, the NPA to greater heights of struggle.
Let's consider the present and objective conditions of the struggle.
With 3,000 armed adherents, the NPA remains a major threat against the government. Their units are still spread throughout the archipelago. Their recruitment remains active.
What the government is not saying is the fact that the countrysides remain as fertile grounds for active involvement in the struggle. The Party and its revolutionary organisations enjoy a massive and widely extensive support base. These bases are still being managed directly by the Party and remains far away from the reach and grasp of government.
Central Visayas and Mindanao remain as active venues for recruitment precisely because of widespread disenchantment with government. The continued bungling of rehabilitation efforts in these parts would result to a horizontal increase of Party supporters and possibly from within, development of new cadres who are bolder and more aggressive than the rest.
The NPA is expected to change their tactics from merely political organizing to political-military work. In order to increase their ranks, they have to engage in active resistance, puncture rural centers of activities and engage in strategic and tactical alliances with other groups to further increase their chances of success against government forces.
With the signing of a peace agreement with the MILF, government will now face new and fresh opposition from groups who oppose the peace deal. These groups are composed not just of Islamic elements but criminal elements funded by traditional power blocs in Mindanao who fear of losing their lands once the Bangsamoro state is established.
Fresh anti-government initiatives are expected to break out in Mindanao which would divide the attention of the state's security forces.
Conflicts within the center of power will continue with elite groups fighting within themselves and government unable to provide sufficient solutions to consumer-related issues. As prices spiral out of control and government continues on its neo-liberal policy of non-interventionism when it comes to prices, dissent will surely increase not just from the ranks of the militants but likewise more political opposition to develop within the ranks of the middle class itself.
These things will develop for the next few months. The worse thing that would happen is when political forces intervene to further heighten these political tensions resulting to a further weakening of the State as it enters another historical milestone in 2016.
Two things are expected to develop as the direct result of the arrests of the Tiamzons. First, a revitalization of the Party and its armed wing and second, a development of a stronger, and more united Front which, given two or three years, would result to the achievement of the strategic stalemate status.
Showing posts with label revolutionary situation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label revolutionary situation. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 26, 2014
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
Soros hand in recent Philippine events
There was a surprising revelation that escaped everybody's attention during the ZTE hearings. I remember one senator (I think its Senator Enrile---just review the transcripts) asking Joey de Venecia who'll back him up financially in the NBN deal. Without batting an eyelash, Joey retorted the magic word: “Soros”.
Ah, Soros.
We all know who George Soros is. For those who don’t, three words to remember about him---Open Democracy (which I espouse), Asian Financial Crisis and Billionaire. He’s the Richard Branson of the financial world. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once blamed him for the Asian financial crisis. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad once accused him of manipulating world markets for his own ends. I remembered FVR telling everybody that George Soros' hand was behind the spate of coups during the Cory Aquino regime.
Who's Soros?
Soros heads the Soros Management Fund, a global operation which essentially promotes open societies. You can check Google or the website http://www.soros.org or www.opendemocracy.net for more details.
Various sources describe him as a Financial speculator, a political activist and even a philosopher. He was once a student of Karl Popper, the philosopher credited of having created the concept of Open Democracy.
Actually, Soros pushes for Open Democracy. However, some sectors attribute sinister political motives behind every Soros' action. Soros hates despots. He was once a victim of fascism. He experienced it first hand when, as a young Hungarian Jew, he suffered first-hand atrocities under Hitler’s regime.
Soros’ stake in the Philippines
Soros is known to finance revolutions. He did it at EDSA. He did it for the Rose Revolution in Europe. For some societies, his participation proved to be crucial. Others, like his part in the repudiation of Bush re-election campaign, was a failure. His 80 billion dollar empire stretches “ in the farthest reaches, in the ends of the earth”, so to speak.
Why finance a revolution in the Philippines?
Obviously, current political reality dictates that changes in the present political structure is in order. The Arroyo administration is slowly becoming despotic. Former US President Bill Clinton’s remark about his former classmate as being “the most feared woman in the Philippines” tells you a lot about how Americans perceive Arroyo’s regime. Analyzing the Philippine situation, there are five (5) things that justifies a regime change.
1. The Arroyo administration’s militarization of the state. The Philippine state is a garrison state, ruled by a chosen few, chosen more for their subservience to the Arroyo clique than anything else. Just looking at the Cabinet and their underlings says much about this administration. Retired generals populate sensitive posts, appointed more on their capabilities at producing financial results to the Arroyo clique than anything. Undersecretaries are mostly business associates of the First Gentleman. Other posts, like the Supreme Court, the Ombusman and even the COMELEC have been given to puppets of the clique.
2. Tendencies in centralizing economic gains. The “improving” economic condition of the Philippines is not a miracle. Globalization has opened the doors of free trade to Asia-Pacific economies. Philippine economic fundamentals remain strong, buoyed by overseas remittances and strong foreign portfolio investments. However, the vertical growth of the economy has not resulted to horizontal development because economic gains failed to redound or spill over to sectors at the middle and bottom rungs of the economy. The reason is simple---a chosen few, the elites, have cornered most of the economic gains. The middle class—the prime motor of economic growth in other countries— remained stagnant. There is limited social movement in this class because of the concentration of wealth. Worst, large chunks of this class have fallen to the lower rungs of the economic strata. Pitifully, the proletarian class has likewise stagnated and remained slave consumers, powerless, and unable to progress to the higher stage of development. This concentration of wealth to a few breeds dissent from disfranchised sectors, creating an inevitable revolutionary situation.
3. Increasing human rights violations. Critics of this administration have suffered most of the brunt of human rights violations, perpetuated by state security agencies. As expected, the ruling oligarchs and their political allies will protect their economic wealth against the counter-elite. Those outside of the politico-economic circle of influence, will, undoubtedly, move to grab this concentrated wealth for themselves. Quite expectedly, force from the counter-elite (dubbed “destabilization” by the ruling elite) will also be met with equal or stronger force as a form of self-preservation or self-defense by the state’s ruling clique. Violations of basic rights are therefore, expected from this power struggle, with underlings suffering the most.
4. Contracting, instead of expanding. With continued destabilization, the state slowly closes its doors to counter-elites, forcing it to isolation. Isolation dictates that trust should only be given to subservient interest groups. Favors, will therefore be dispensed to those who pledge allegiance to the clique. The state in this situation contracts, and this contraction will also affect not only the political realm but also in the economic realm. This is quite evident in the ZTE deal. The administration gave the deal to the Chinese because it was supported by a strong financial ally (Razon) and a political wheeler-dealer (Abalos). Such situations can never be avoided under the current state of affairs. The weakness of this administration is exploitable because it is being forced to give in to economic favours to maintain status quo. The continued destabilization coming from a disfranchised counter-elite forces slowly weakens the state and thus, as a natural reaction, the state tries to gain strength by expanding its support bases, which, in this case, can only come from members of the economic community and the political operators.
5. Weakening state security. GMA’s decision to scrap the ZTE deal due to political noise tells you a lot about this administration. It has been decisively weakened. It has exposed its weakness by bowing to political pressure. Yes, this blogger encouraged GMA to stand down, because, following political strategy, that’s the most logical survival tactic available to her. The explosive nature of the controversy could force her ouster. However, her decision actually resulted to prolong her rule only for a few weeks or months, not years. The state’s weak state will affect not only her administration, but will definitely affect even the economy.
Indications of an impending regime change
1. Strengthening of the peso. Reports say that the peso will hit 40 or even 37 by year’s end. Is this good or is this bad? Obviously, it’s very bad. The peso’s comfortable exchange rate is around 40-41 pesos for a dollar. Some sectors are spreading the rumour that it could hit 37 or even 30 by 2008. This is bad because a strong peso will undoubtedly affect the export sector. You will have a situation where hundreds of small and medium sized export enterprises will be forced to close down because of this. You’ll have a situation where families relying on remittances will receive lesser amount of money than before. When you have a strong peso, you’ll be lessening the purchasing power of the middle class and the remittance-dependent lower classes, resulting to increased poverty. And, you’ll also find thousands of Filipinos out of work because hundreds of export companies will be forced to close shop. When you have that kind of situation, you are creating a replica of what happened in Argentina many years ago.
2. Demoralization among the soldiers’ ranks. The AFP admits this. Reports say, Esperon will file coup d’etat charges against six lieutenants. Note that those involved here are lieutenants, not colonels and definitely, not generals. This indicates a massive number of demoralized soldiers and when you have that kind of situation, you definitely have a serious issue at hand. Defeats in the Southern arena of war continues and GMA’s trusty military puppets will definitely have a hard time convincing troops to remain loyal.
3. Increasing dissent in the disfranchised sectors of society. The ZTE deal exposed a raw nerve in the Filipino psyche. It fueled hate. It fanned the flames of paninibugho (for a lack of an English translation, I wrote the Filipino term here---my apologies), a feeling more serious than the Western concept of hatred.
4. Losing political base. There’s a split in the ruling clique brought by the ZTE deal. Concessions were granted to other members of the clique to the consternation of other loyal subjects of the clique. This sprawn a division which could lead to ouster of the head of the clique. Far worst, this shows a permanent crack in the relationship, which obviously, was a patron-client one. The lost of a stable political base further led to a weakening, which, in this case, puts the regime in a serious state.
Soros knows this. Expect a heightening of tensions between inter-elites which could lead to an implosion. This implosion will fuel destabilization which will lead to disintegration of existing relationships and possible ouster from power possibly in the first quarter of next year. Or even earlier.
Ah, Soros.
We all know who George Soros is. For those who don’t, three words to remember about him---Open Democracy (which I espouse), Asian Financial Crisis and Billionaire. He’s the Richard Branson of the financial world. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once blamed him for the Asian financial crisis. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad once accused him of manipulating world markets for his own ends. I remembered FVR telling everybody that George Soros' hand was behind the spate of coups during the Cory Aquino regime.
Who's Soros?
Soros heads the Soros Management Fund, a global operation which essentially promotes open societies. You can check Google or the website http://www.soros.org or www.opendemocracy.net for more details.
Various sources describe him as a Financial speculator, a political activist and even a philosopher. He was once a student of Karl Popper, the philosopher credited of having created the concept of Open Democracy.
Actually, Soros pushes for Open Democracy. However, some sectors attribute sinister political motives behind every Soros' action. Soros hates despots. He was once a victim of fascism. He experienced it first hand when, as a young Hungarian Jew, he suffered first-hand atrocities under Hitler’s regime.
Soros’ stake in the Philippines
Soros is known to finance revolutions. He did it at EDSA. He did it for the Rose Revolution in Europe. For some societies, his participation proved to be crucial. Others, like his part in the repudiation of Bush re-election campaign, was a failure. His 80 billion dollar empire stretches “ in the farthest reaches, in the ends of the earth”, so to speak.
Why finance a revolution in the Philippines?
Obviously, current political reality dictates that changes in the present political structure is in order. The Arroyo administration is slowly becoming despotic. Former US President Bill Clinton’s remark about his former classmate as being “the most feared woman in the Philippines” tells you a lot about how Americans perceive Arroyo’s regime. Analyzing the Philippine situation, there are five (5) things that justifies a regime change.
1. The Arroyo administration’s militarization of the state. The Philippine state is a garrison state, ruled by a chosen few, chosen more for their subservience to the Arroyo clique than anything else. Just looking at the Cabinet and their underlings says much about this administration. Retired generals populate sensitive posts, appointed more on their capabilities at producing financial results to the Arroyo clique than anything. Undersecretaries are mostly business associates of the First Gentleman. Other posts, like the Supreme Court, the Ombusman and even the COMELEC have been given to puppets of the clique.
2. Tendencies in centralizing economic gains. The “improving” economic condition of the Philippines is not a miracle. Globalization has opened the doors of free trade to Asia-Pacific economies. Philippine economic fundamentals remain strong, buoyed by overseas remittances and strong foreign portfolio investments. However, the vertical growth of the economy has not resulted to horizontal development because economic gains failed to redound or spill over to sectors at the middle and bottom rungs of the economy. The reason is simple---a chosen few, the elites, have cornered most of the economic gains. The middle class—the prime motor of economic growth in other countries— remained stagnant. There is limited social movement in this class because of the concentration of wealth. Worst, large chunks of this class have fallen to the lower rungs of the economic strata. Pitifully, the proletarian class has likewise stagnated and remained slave consumers, powerless, and unable to progress to the higher stage of development. This concentration of wealth to a few breeds dissent from disfranchised sectors, creating an inevitable revolutionary situation.
3. Increasing human rights violations. Critics of this administration have suffered most of the brunt of human rights violations, perpetuated by state security agencies. As expected, the ruling oligarchs and their political allies will protect their economic wealth against the counter-elite. Those outside of the politico-economic circle of influence, will, undoubtedly, move to grab this concentrated wealth for themselves. Quite expectedly, force from the counter-elite (dubbed “destabilization” by the ruling elite) will also be met with equal or stronger force as a form of self-preservation or self-defense by the state’s ruling clique. Violations of basic rights are therefore, expected from this power struggle, with underlings suffering the most.
4. Contracting, instead of expanding. With continued destabilization, the state slowly closes its doors to counter-elites, forcing it to isolation. Isolation dictates that trust should only be given to subservient interest groups. Favors, will therefore be dispensed to those who pledge allegiance to the clique. The state in this situation contracts, and this contraction will also affect not only the political realm but also in the economic realm. This is quite evident in the ZTE deal. The administration gave the deal to the Chinese because it was supported by a strong financial ally (Razon) and a political wheeler-dealer (Abalos). Such situations can never be avoided under the current state of affairs. The weakness of this administration is exploitable because it is being forced to give in to economic favours to maintain status quo. The continued destabilization coming from a disfranchised counter-elite forces slowly weakens the state and thus, as a natural reaction, the state tries to gain strength by expanding its support bases, which, in this case, can only come from members of the economic community and the political operators.
5. Weakening state security. GMA’s decision to scrap the ZTE deal due to political noise tells you a lot about this administration. It has been decisively weakened. It has exposed its weakness by bowing to political pressure. Yes, this blogger encouraged GMA to stand down, because, following political strategy, that’s the most logical survival tactic available to her. The explosive nature of the controversy could force her ouster. However, her decision actually resulted to prolong her rule only for a few weeks or months, not years. The state’s weak state will affect not only her administration, but will definitely affect even the economy.
Indications of an impending regime change
1. Strengthening of the peso. Reports say that the peso will hit 40 or even 37 by year’s end. Is this good or is this bad? Obviously, it’s very bad. The peso’s comfortable exchange rate is around 40-41 pesos for a dollar. Some sectors are spreading the rumour that it could hit 37 or even 30 by 2008. This is bad because a strong peso will undoubtedly affect the export sector. You will have a situation where hundreds of small and medium sized export enterprises will be forced to close down because of this. You’ll have a situation where families relying on remittances will receive lesser amount of money than before. When you have a strong peso, you’ll be lessening the purchasing power of the middle class and the remittance-dependent lower classes, resulting to increased poverty. And, you’ll also find thousands of Filipinos out of work because hundreds of export companies will be forced to close shop. When you have that kind of situation, you are creating a replica of what happened in Argentina many years ago.
2. Demoralization among the soldiers’ ranks. The AFP admits this. Reports say, Esperon will file coup d’etat charges against six lieutenants. Note that those involved here are lieutenants, not colonels and definitely, not generals. This indicates a massive number of demoralized soldiers and when you have that kind of situation, you definitely have a serious issue at hand. Defeats in the Southern arena of war continues and GMA’s trusty military puppets will definitely have a hard time convincing troops to remain loyal.
3. Increasing dissent in the disfranchised sectors of society. The ZTE deal exposed a raw nerve in the Filipino psyche. It fueled hate. It fanned the flames of paninibugho (for a lack of an English translation, I wrote the Filipino term here---my apologies), a feeling more serious than the Western concept of hatred.
4. Losing political base. There’s a split in the ruling clique brought by the ZTE deal. Concessions were granted to other members of the clique to the consternation of other loyal subjects of the clique. This sprawn a division which could lead to ouster of the head of the clique. Far worst, this shows a permanent crack in the relationship, which obviously, was a patron-client one. The lost of a stable political base further led to a weakening, which, in this case, puts the regime in a serious state.
Soros knows this. Expect a heightening of tensions between inter-elites which could lead to an implosion. This implosion will fuel destabilization which will lead to disintegration of existing relationships and possible ouster from power possibly in the first quarter of next year. Or even earlier.
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