The Mindanao War, part 1

Brussels-based International Crisis Group validated earlier entries in this site on the continued existence of about 60 Islamic militants allegedly seeking sanctuary in Mindanao.

Yesterday, former General and now head of the Philippine counter-terrorism unit, Arturo Lomibao, echoed the ICG's concern--that despite strict controls, members of the Jemaah Islamiyah continue to pour into Mindanao. 

This problem persists despite billions of pesos worth of government intelligence funds and overseas development assistance (ODA). Likewise, the failure of CIA-sponsored civic organisations and "peace groups" to penetrate the deep cover of JI in Mindanao is also one factor.

The presence of Islamic militants in Mindanao is not new. Since the 1970's, Mindanao has been the haven of jihadists escaping the long arm of the law in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. It is not surprising since Mindanao's lush forests provide a convenient cover for militarist trainings; and its long coastlines, somewhat indefensible and poorly monitored, give jihadists convenient entry and exit into so-called Philippine territory.

Compounding this is the lack of trust among Muslim communities on anything "government-related" or "government-initiated". Intelligence units try and fail to get substantial information because they lack public support, plus the fact that the citizenry now perceives them as a foreign invading force out to destroy Bangsamoro land. 

However, I do disagree with the findings of the ICG on the status of hostilities between the MILF and the AFP. The ICG claims that both forces don't have enough resources to sustain a long-drawn out war. 

Firstly, the MILF does not need resources comparable to those of an regular army formation. By the looks of it, the MILF has abandoned the strategy of maintaining full army-size battalion units and has shown the capability of fully utilising mobile guerilla units. Hence, the Bangsamoro Islamic Liberation Army Front (BILAF) enjoys both strategic and tactical advantages over the AFP since maintaining guerrilla units is more cost-effective.

And in a guerilla war situation, the longer it takes, the higher the success rate for the MILF. Inversely, the longer this war takes on the GRP, the lower the success rate of the AFP in winning this theater of war. Why? The AFP would be over-extending its forces, combatting extremists, Bangsamoro mujaheddins, extremist forces lurking within its organisation and the New People's Army. In this kind of war, superiority in numbers does'nt count much since any guerilla warfare expert would definitely tell you that it's just a matter of time before a highly efficient and mobile guerilla organisation cuts an army to pieces. Cases in point: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Kosovo, Chechnya, China, Cuba, and of course, Somalia.

Foreign Islamic militants serve not just as bearers of new technology; they serve as morale boasters. Equipped with the knowledge of Islam, these JI members are better than army chaplains. They can go to the battlefield and provide psychological support to guerillas. Plus factor is most of these Islamists are experts in Islamic studies; hence, they conduct religious indoctrination to those communities within the guerillas' area of operations.

Their presence also changes the complexion of the war since it brings international attention to this war in Mindanao. International attention means more money and more logistics, thus prolonging the capability of the Bangsamoro mujaheddin to wage war against the AFP.

So, we see the difference. The orientation of the Bangsamoro is strategic while the AFP is more tactical. The AFP intends to defeat the MILF camp-per-camp, a conventional strategy. While the Bangsamoro mujaheddins plans to defeat the entire force of the GRP through a strategic and protracted guerilla war. 

Problems I see

One sticky issue that could hamper and even affect the outcome of this guerilla war is the on-going internal issues happening within the guerilla organisation. Despite MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu's denials that there is no "animosity" happening between MILF ground commanders and the leadership of Murad, the disparity between his "official statement" and those recently said by MILF Commander Bravo over at ABS-CBN says volumes on the miscommunication between Murad's group and those of his commanders. 

Commander Bravo's statement borders on military engagement while Kabalu's statement echoes the stand of the MILF Central Leadership. It is possible that Murad's group is being "isolated" right now by at least ten field commanders. 

Basis? First, these field commanders oppose any negotiations with the GRP. Even at the start of the negotiations, MILF field commanders have registered their protest, owing to their previous experience talking peace with GRP. This fact belies the statement issued by US Ambassador Kristie Kenney, which cast doubt on the capability of Murad to "bring in the numbers" should a peace settlement really happen. Earlier reports suggest that even if a peace pact is agreed upon by both parties, the probability of assimilating MILF forces into the mainstream remains slim or even nil. 

Second, the opposition of the commanders show how extensive the organisational influence of Islamist thinking among the MILF organisation. Majority of the MILF believes in waging jihad instead of talking peace with these mushrikuns and kafirs. This shows a deeper appreciation of correct Islamic thinking which reminds you of the pervasive influence of Salamat-oriented thinking instead of Murad's. However, I think this thinking has evolved to include JI-oriented thinking, which is more internationalist than Salamat's. 

Losing Murad

There is a possibility that Murad's isolation will be complete in the next few weeks or months. Should Murad lose the MILF leadership, the vacuum would be filled by a more militant leader who'll definitely abandon any peace talks and who'll set his sights on international solidarity. 

A split within the MILF, however, should not be a cause of joy for the GRP. On the contrary, this will show a change in the complexion of the war. 

Likewise, if the GRP thinks that these commanders will just went over the fence and go to Nur Misuari's camp, think again. Indications point to a formation of a new group whose orientation is more on protracted jihad than talking peace. Misuari's influence is not that pervasive nor persuasive. If Misuari thinks that he can still unify the Bangsamoro People under his supposed leadership, he's mistaken. He has been co-opted already and enjoys only a miniscule of support even among the Tausugs.

However, the possibility of two theaters of war exists. The GRP would be battling two fronts: the new organisation of MILF commanders and Misuari's peace army. Oh, include that section of the ASG. 

Next, I will be discussing the widespread implications of this in RP and the region. So, stay tune...